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Abstract
We prove that the graph of the logit equilibrium correspondence
is a smooth manifold, which uniformly approximates the graph of the
Nash equilibrium manifold.
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1 Introduction
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Theorem 1) showed that the graph of the Nash
equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to the set of payoff functions.
Ritzberger (1994, Proposition 2) proved that the graph of the Nash equilib-
rium correspondence can be uniformly approximated by a smooth manifold.
In this note we provide a specific smooth manifold that uniformly approxi-
mates the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence, namely, the graph
of the logit equilibrium correspondence, a solution concept that was defined
by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
The significance of this result stems from the need to apply topological
results to the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence. Various topo-
logical results are proven for smooth manifolds. Since the graph of the Nash
equilibrium correspondence is not a smooth manifold, these results cannot be
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applied to this graph. The ability to apply these results to a smooth manifold
that uniformly approximates the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspon-
dence may be sufficient for various proofs. Though by Ritzberger’s (1994)
result it is known that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence
can be approximated by some smooth manifold, the logit equilibrium has
the additional advantage that it is completely mixed, a property that can be
sometimes useful, see, e.g, Solan and Solan (2018).
2 The Model and Main Result
A strategic game form is a pair (I, A) where I = {1, 2, . . . , d} is a finite
set of players and A = ×i∈IAi is the Cartesian product of finite sets of pure
strategies for the players. A payoff function for player i for the strategic game
form (I, A) is a function ui : A → R, and a payoff function is a collection
u = (ui)i∈I of payoff functions for the players. Consequently, the set of all
payoff functions is equivalent to RA×I . A triplet (I, A, u) where u is a payoff
function for the strategic game form (I, A) is a game.
A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution xi ∈ ∆(Ai),
and a mixed strategy profile is a collection x = (xi)i∈I of mixed strategies
for the players. It follows that the set of all mixed strategy profiles is X :=
×i∈I∆(Ai) ⊂ R
∪i∈IAi . A payoff function ui for player i is extended to a
function from X to R in a multilinear fashion.
A mixed strategy profile x ∈ X is a (Nash) equilibrium of the game
(I, A, u) if ui(x) ≥ ui(ai, x−i) for every player i ∈ I and every pure strategy
ai ∈ Ai. When the strategic game form is fixed, the graph of the Nash
equilibrium correspondence is the collection of all pairs of a payoff function
and equilibrium in the game induced by this payoff function.
Definition 2.1 Let (I, A) be a strategic game form. The graph of the Nash
equilibrium correspondence of (I, A) is the set
M :=
{
(u, x) ∈ RA×I ×X : x is an equilibrium of (I, A, u)
}
⊂ RA×I×R∪i∈IAi.
As mentioned above, Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) proved that the set
M is homeomorphic to the set of games, namely, to RA×I . An important
concept that we will need is that of logit equilibrium, which we define now.
Definition 2.2 (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) Let (I, A, u) be a game
and let n > 0. The mixed strategy profile x is a logit equilibrium with
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parameter n of the game (I, A, u) if for every player i ∈ I and every pure
strategy ai ∈ Ai,
xi(ai) =
exp(nui(x, ai))∑
a′
i
∈Ai
exp(nui(x, a′i))
. (1)
Standard continuity arguments show that a limit of logit equilibria with
parameter n as n goes to infinity is a Nash equilibrium, see McKlevey and
Palfrey (1995, Theorem 2).
Definition 2.3 Let (I, A) be a strategic game form. For every real number
n, the graph of the logit equilibrium correspondence of (I, A) is the set
Mn := {(u, x) : x is a logit equilibrium with parameter n in (I, A, u)} ⊂ R
A×I×R∪i∈IAi .
Our first main result is that the graph of the logit correspondence is a
smooth manifold.
Theorem 2.4 The set Mn is a smooth manifold of dimension |A| × |I|.
Our second main result is that the graph of the logit correspondence
uniformly approximates the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence.
Theorem 2.5 There are a function ϕ : M → RA×I, and for every n ∈
N there is a smooth function ϕn : Mn → R
A×I that satisfy the following
property: For every ε > 0 there is N = N(ε) > 0 such that for every n ≥ N
we have
‖ϕ−1(y)− (ϕn)
−1(y)‖2 ≤ ε, ∀y ∈ R
A×I .
3 Proofs
To prove that Mn is a smooth manifold we need to study a certain function
that will be used in the definition of the immersion between Mn and R
A×I .
Recall that an immersion is a differentiable function between differentiable
manifolds whose derivative is everywhere injective (one-to-one). The keen
reader will identify the origin of this function and the proof of Theorem 2.4
below in the work of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
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Lemma 3.1 For every n > 0 define the function g(n) : Rd → Rd by
g
(n)
i (x) = xi +
exp(nxi)∑d
j=1 exp(nxj)
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , d}.
The function g(n) is one-to-one, onto, and an immersion.
Proof.
Step 1: The function g(n) is an immersion.
An n× n matrix A is a CL-matrix if (a) its diagonal entries are positive,
(b) its off-diagonal entries are negative, and (c) the sum of elements in each
column is positive. Thus, CL-matrices are subclasses of both L-matrices and
column strictly diagonally dominant matrices. By the Levy-Desplanques
Theorem, every CL-matrix is invertible.
We first argue that the Jacobian matrix of g(n) is a CL-matrix at all points.
Indeed, simple algebraic calculations show that for every i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , d},
∂g
(n)
i
∂xi
(x) = 1 +
n exp(nxi)
(∑
k 6=i exp(nxk)
)
(∑d
k=1 exp(nxk)
)2 > 0, (2)
∂g
(n)
i
∂xj
(x) = −
n exp(n(xi + xj))(∑d
k=1 exp(nxk)
)2 < 0, ∀j 6= i. (3)
In particular, Conditions (a) and (b) hold for the Jacobian matrix of g(n) at
every point x. We also have
d∑
i=1
g
(n)
i (x) = 1 +
d∑
i=1
xi,
and therefore
d∑
i=1
∂g
(n)
i
∂xj
(x) = 1 > 0, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
so that Condition (c) holds as well, and the Jacobian matrix is a CL-matrix
at all points. It follows that the Jacobian matrix is invertible at all points,
hence g(n) is an immersion.
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Step 2: The function g(n) is onto.
To prove that g(n) is onto we will show that its image is both open and
closed. Since the Jacobian matrix of g(n) at every point x is invertible, by
the Open Mapping Theorem the image of g(n) is an open set. To show that
the image of g(n) is closed, note that ‖x − g(n)(x)‖2 ≤ 1 for every x ∈ R
d,
and consider a sequence (yk)k∈N of points in the image of g that converges
to a point y. For each k ∈ N let xk ∈ Rd satisfy yk = g(n)(xk). Since
‖xk − yk‖2 ≤ 1, and since the sequence (y
k)k∈N converges, it follows that
there is a subsequence (xkl)l∈N that converges to a limit x. Since the function
g(n) is continuous, g(n)(x) = y, so that y is in the image of g(n), which implies
that the image of g(n) is closed.
Step 3: The function g(n) is one-to-one.
We argue that any function whose Jacobian matrix is a CL-matrix is one-
to-one. Indeed, let f be such a function, assume w.l.o.g. that f(~0) = ~0, and
fix x 6= ~0. We will show that f(x) 6= ~0. We have
f(x) = f(0) +
∫ 1
t=0
dftx · xdt =
(∫ 1
t=0
dftxdt
)
· x.
The matrix
∫ 1
t=0
dftxdt, as an integral of CL-matrices, is a CL-matrix, hence
invertible. In particular, f(x) =
(∫ 1
t=0
dftxdt
)
· x 6= ~0, as claimed.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) provided an
equivalent representation to games. Let u : A → RI be a payoff function.
For every i ∈ I define two functions u˜i : A→ R and ui : Ai → R by
ui(ai) :=
1
|A−i|
∑
a−i∈A−i
ui(ai, a−i), (4)
u˜i(a) := ui(a)− ui(ai). (5)
We denote this representation by u = 〈u˜, u〉. Since ui(a) = u˜i(a) + ui(ai),
this representation is one-to-one and onto.
Fix n > 0 and define a function zn : Mn → R
∪i∈IAi by
zn,i,ai(u, x) := ui(ai, x−i) +
exp(nui(ai, x−i))∑
j∈I exp(nuj(aj, x−j))
, ∀i ∈ I, ai ∈ Ai.
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Define now a function ϕn : Mn → R
A×I by
ϕn(u, x) := 〈u˜, zn(u, x)〉. (6)
Lemma 3.1 implies that the function ϕn is one-to-one, onto, and an immer-
sion. The result follows.
We now prove that the inverse of g(n) converges uniformly as n goes
to infinity, and we provide an explicit form to the limit function, which is
nothing but the homeomorphism defined by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
Lemma 3.2 For every n > 0 let h(n) : Rd → Rd be the inverse of g(n). Let
h : Rd → Rd be the function defined by
hi(y) := min{yi, α
∗}, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , d,
where α∗ := max
{
α ∈ R :
∑d
i=1(yi − α)+ = 1
}
. Then the sequence of func-
tions (h(n))n>0 converges uniformly to the function h.
Proof. Fix ε > 0, and let n > 0 be sufficiently large so that ε >
1/(1 + exp(εn)). Fix y ∈ Rd and define x := h(y) and x(n) := h(n)(y).
Assume w.l.o.g. that y1 ≤ y2 ≤ · · · ≤ yd. By the definition of g
(n) we have
x
(n)
1 ≤ x
(n)
2 ≤ · · · ≤ x
(n)
d . By the definition of h we have x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xd.
Since
d∑
i=1
(yi − α
∗)+ = 1 =
d∑
i=1
(yi − x
(n)
i ) =
d∑
i=1
(yi − x
(n)
i )+,
and since x
(n)
1 ≤ x
(n)
2 ≤ · · · ≤ x
(n)
d , it follows that x
(n)
d ≥ α
∗ = xd.
For every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} denote
αi := yi − xi ≥ 0,
and
α
(n)
i := yi − x
(n)
i ≥ 0.
We now claim that α
(n)
i < αi + ε. Indeed, assume to the contrary that for
some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} we have α
(n)
i ≥ αi + ε. Then in particular
x
(n)
i = yi − α
(n)
i ≤ yi − αi − ε = xi − ε ≤ xd − ε ≤ x
(n)
d − ε.
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Therefore, by the definition of g(n),
ε ≤ α
(n)
i =
exp(nx
(n)
i )∑d
j=1 exp(nx
(n)
j )
≤
exp(nx
(n)
i )
exp(nx
(n)
i + nx
(n)
d )
=
1
1 + exp
(
n(x
(n)
d − x
(n)
i )
) ≤ 1
1 + exp(εn)
,
a contradiction to the choice of n. Since
∑d
i=1 α
(n)
i = 1 =
∑d
i=1 αi, we deduce
that for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} we have
αi − dε < α
(n)
i < αi + ε,
which implies that ‖h(n)(y)−h(y)‖∞ ≤ dε, and the desired result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. In the proof of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986,
Theorem 1) it was shown that the following function ϕ : M → RA×I is a
homeomorphism:
ϕ(u, x) := 〈u˜, z(u, x)〉, ∀(u, x) ∈M,
where notations follow the proof of Theorem 2.4 and
zi,ai(u, x) := ui(ai, x−i) + xi(ai), ∀i ∈ I, ai ∈ Ai.
Theorem 2.5 follows from Lemma 3.2.
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